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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KIP LANE MASSEY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 950431-CA 
Priority No. 2 
This case arises from a jury conviction for (1) theft by 
receiving stolen property, a 2nd degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and (2) sale of a firearm to a 
juvenile, a 3rd degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-509.9 (1995). Prior to the jury trial in this matter, 
counsel for Appellant Kip Lane Massey ("Massey") requested the 
entry of an order continuing the trial, scheduled for April 13, 
1995, in order that co-defendant Casey Sanslow ("Sanslow") would 
be able to testify in Massey's defense. Sanslow was scheduled to 
enter a guilty plea to the same charges in a separate matter on 
April 17, 1995. Upon the advice of counsel, Sanslow invoked his 
fifth amendment right against self incrimination until such time 
as the guilty plea in his case was entered. Thus, Sanslow was 
legally unavailable to testify in Massey's trial at the scheduled 
time. 
The trial court denied Massey's motion to continue the April 
13th trial. Consequently, since Sanslow was legally unavailable 
to testify at trial, counsel for Massey requested that the trial 
court admit into evidence a two-sentence written statement from 
Sanslow exonerating Massey. The trial court granted the request. 
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Massey's jury trial concluded on April 14, 1995. On April 
17, 1995, Sanslow entered his guilty plea in the separate matter. 
Since he no longer was invoking his fifth amendment right, 
Sanslow made available to Massey for the first time in June 1995 
a more detailed outline concerning his involvement in the crimes. 
The affidavit testimony lends unyielding credibility to the two-
sentence written statement. Massey filed the sworn statement 
together with a motion for a new trial on the basis that Sanslow 
would be able now to provide critically important testimony. The 
trial court denied the motion and Massey has appealed from that 
order on the grounds that the trial court erred in its ruling 
where Massey has satisfied the three elements for a new trial set 
forth in State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). 
The state's response to the issue raised on appeal is two 
fold. First, the state asserts the issue was not properly 
preserved for appeal purposes. Second, the state argues that 
Massey has failed to satisfy two of the three elements set forth 
in James, 819 P.2d at 793, and necessary to a reversal of the 
trial court's order. The state's responses are addressed below. 
POINT I. MASSEY PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUES FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW, 
In response to the issue raised in Massey's opening brief, 
the state claims Massey "waived his appellate claim." (Brief of 
Appellee ("S.B.") at 8-9.) According to the state, the issue was 
not preserved where Massey sought the following: 
(1) The entry of an order continuing the trial (Record on 
Appeal ("R.") at 99). 
When the trial court indicated that request would be denied, 
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Massey requested in the alternative, 
(2) the entry of an order admitting into evidence Sanslow's 
two-sentence, written confession since Sanslow was legally 
unavailable to testify (R. at 100 ("we are aware of the 
problem the co-defendant [Sanslow] has [in invoking the 
fifth amendment until such time as his plea is entered], 
however I have no control over when he enters his plea or 
not. If [the court is inclined to go forward with the trial 
on April 13] , we'd be making a motion that [Sanslow] be at 
least declared unavailable so we can use his statement"). 
Once Sanslow was available after trial to provide details about 
the transaction with the Kirbys, Massey requested, 
(3) the entry of an order for a new trial on the grounds 
that previously unavailable and undiscoverable evidence was 
now discoverable and available (R. 84-85; 103-03). 
The state's waiver argument suggests that although Massey 
made a request to admit the written statement into evidence as a 
fall-back position after the trial court indicated it would deny 
the motion to continue the trial, Massey was estopped from 
seeking a new trial when Sanslow was able to make more detailed 
information available concerning his involvement in the crimes. 
See State v. Anderson, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 (Utah 1996) 
(party cannot take advantage of error committed at trial when 
party led trial court into committing error). The state's 
argument also suggests Massey made the motion for a new trial 
simply because he was displeased with the verdict. The state's 
waiver argument lacks merit. 
Massey did not lead the trial court into committing error, 
then seek to "take advantage of the error" by appealing the case. 
See Id. He requested use of the written statement after the 
court denied the motion to continue and because it was the only 
statement available. At the time of trial, Massey could not and 
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had no way to guarantee that at some later date Sanslow would be 
available to provide a more detailed statement. Thus, Massey 
sought entry of the written statement. He had no other way to 
get Sanslow's admission into evidence since the trial court had 
already indicated it would deny his motion to continue the trial. 
Once Sanslow made a more detailed statement available, 
Massey had an independent, legally justifiable basis for 
requesting a new trial: Sanslow's ability to provide for the 
first time details concerning the transaction with the Kirbys. 
The state cites to State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987), in support of its waiver argument. (S.B. at 9.) 
That case is distinguishable. In Medina, defendant was charged 
with second-degree murder. Id. at 1022. At the close of the 
evidence, the jury commenced a lengthy deliberation, then sent a 
question to the judge. The judge called the jury to the 
courtroom to provide a modified instruction, which counsel for 
both parties reviewed. The judge asked each side if there were 
any objections to the instruction. Defense counsel stated: "I 
have no objection. I have read it," referring to the instruction. 
Id. The judge provided the jury with the new instruction and the 
jury returned with a guilty verdict. Id. Defendant appealed the 
judgment and asked the court to consider whether the modified 
instruction was acceptable. Id. at 1022-23. 
Later in Anderson, 3 05 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, the Utah Sup-
reme Court acknowledged "the [Medina] instruction seemed ill-
advised." However, the Medina court declined to reach the issue 
on appeal since "defense counsel not only failed to object to the 
4 
proposed instruction, but she affirmatively stated that after 
reading it, she had 'no objection.7" Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. 
In this matter, defense counsel could not have reviewed or 
discovered the details of Sanslow's testimony until after the 
trial. Once defense counsel was apprised of Sanslow's more de-
tailed testimony, counsel moved for a new trial in order that it 
could be presented to the trier of fact for consideration. This 
case would be similar to Medina if counsel had known the content 
of Sanslow's more detailed testimony prior to trial and he had 
been available to testify, yet counsel sought admission only of 
the written statement. Since it was impossible prior to trial for 
counsel to discover Sanslow's complete testimony, this case com-
pels a result different from Medina. By seeking admission of the 
written statement after the court denied the motion to continue, 
Massey did not concede it was a sufficient replacement for 
detailed testimony that would be discovered later, after trial. 
Furthermore, the trial court considered Massey's motion for 
a new trial on the merits, thereby preserving the issue for 
appeal. (R. 461-68.) See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 
(Utah 1991) (when trial court addresses merits of issue raised 
for first time in new trial motion, any prior waiver is excused); 
State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 
865 (1993) . The matter must now be resolved on appeal. 
POINT II. ACCORDING TO THE STATE, MASSEY HAS SATISFIED 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEW TRIAL SET FORTH IN JAMES. 
In response to Massey's argument on the merits, the state 
does not dispute that Massey has satisfied the first prong set 
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forth in State v. James 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991), compelling 
a reversal of the trial court's ruling. (See S.B. at 9-16.) 
According to the court in James, a trial court's failure to grant 
a motion for a new trial is an abuse of discretion where "there 
is a grave suspicion that justice may have miscarried because of 
the lack of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence 
will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant on 
obtaining a new trial . . . are present." James, 819 P.2d at 794 
n.41. The "other elements" have been set forth as follows: "(1) 
[the evidence] must be such as could not with reasonable 
diligence have been discoverable and produced at the trial; (2) 
it must not be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to 
render a different result probable on the retrial of the case." 
Id. 
The state acknowledges by its silence that the first element 
in James has been satisfied; the evidence at issue could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered or produced at the 
trial. The state contends only that the second and third elements 
have not been satisfied. (See S.B. in general.) 
A. THE STATE'S ADMISSIONS BELIE ITS ASSERTION THAT 
SANSLOWS AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY WAS "MERELY CUMULATIVE." 
The state claims Sanslow's affidavit testimony was "merely 
cumulative to the [two-sentence written] confession." (S.B. at 9-
12.) Yet in support of that conclusion, the state admits Sanslow 
would have provided additional, detailed information if he had 
testified as set forth in the affidavit. The state acknowledges 
Sanslow would have provided "extra detail [into] peripheral 
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matters, like corroborating that defendant had never seen the 
Derringer, specifically identifying Travis Kirby as the buyer, 
and specifically identifying the .22 pistol as a Derringer." 
(S.B. at 11.) In fact, Sanslow was the only person for Massey's 
defense who could have described in detail the transaction, the 
gun, and the Kirby brother involved in the transaction. The 
affidavit outlines how and when Sanslow came to be in possession 
of the Derringer pistol (R. 103, HU 3 and 4); why he wanted to 
get rid of it (R. 104, *f 5); his conversation with the Kirby 
brother who purchased the pistol (R. 104, H 6); information going 
to the fact that Massey was not present or at home during the 
transaction (R. 104, % 7 and 8); and the aftermath of the 
incident, including Sanslow's entry of the guilty plea (R. 104, 
Kit 9-11) . With the additional information, the affidavit is 
anything but "merely cumulative." | 
The state's admissions concerning the "extra detail" belie 
its conclusion that the affidavit was "merely cumulative." The 
extra detail goes to the heart of the distinction the state 
attempts to draw between this matter and the facts in James, 
(S.B. 11-12.) 
In James, witness Peterson claimed that James confessed in 
jail to killing his son. James denied that he made the 
confession. The defense discovered after trial a new witness 
that would corroborate James' testimony disavowing the 
confession. The trial court found the new witness's testimony to 
be cumulative. On appeal, "[t]he supreme court reversed, holding 
that the evidence was not cumulative, but was 'independent 
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evidence which corroborated defendant's statements.'" (S.B. at 
11-12 (quoting James, 819 P.2d at 795).) 
According to the state, the James jury "heard no testimony, 
live or otherwise, corroborating James' testimony. [Yet in] this 
case, the jury heard hearsay testimony corroborating defendant's 
testimony." (S.B. at 12.) The state has misconstrued the nature 
of the ruling in James. There the court considered the 
independent aspects of the newly discovered evidence. The new 
witness offered evidence separate from that which was presented 
to the jury at trial. The independent evidence corroborated 
James' testimony that he did not make the confession. 
Likewise, Sanslow's testimony is independent in nature from 
Massey's testimony and the two-sentence statement as set forth 
above. As acknowledged by the prosecutor in this matter, the 
two-sentence written statement failed to specifically identify 
the handgun that was sold to the Kirbys. (R. 4 08-09 (Prosecutor: 
"Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun. The only thing he 
calls it is a little .22 handgun. This is the statement from 
Casey Sanslow. Doesn't even refer to it as a Derringer").) In 
addition, the prosecutor attacked the credibility of Sanslow's 
written statement because it lacked detail and the parties were 
not able to question Sanslow to clarify facts. (R. 408-09.) The 
prosecutor stated: 
Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun. The only thing he 
calls it is a little .22 handgun. This is the statement 
from Casey Sanslow. Doesn't even refer to it as a 
Derringer. You got to wonder whether he's even talking 
about the same gun. I mean maybe they sold so many guns, 
they're starting to get confused over how many guns they 
sold and on which days. 
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All he says is, "I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession 
on June 21st a little .22 handgun, which I sold to the Kirby 
twins." 
Gosh, got to even wonder if he knew who he sold it to. 
The Kirby twins? They're not twins. They're brothers. 
One's fifteen. One's seventeen. They don't look alike. 
You saw both of them yesterday. And yet here in the 
statement, he says, "I sold it to the Kirby twins." 
(R. 408-09.) The prosecutor found an opportunity in the lack of 
detail, and filled in the gaps with unfounded speculation that 
Sanslow and/or Massey were in the business of selling guns. (See 
R. 358; 408-09.) If Sanslow had testified, his testimony would 
have provided new, additional information that would have 
clarified the written statement and dispelled unfounded 
speculation and misconceptions. Sanslow's more detailed affidavit 
testimony did not simply bolster credibility, but it also 
discredited the prosecutor's attack. Sanslow's more detailed 
independent statement was the only evidence that would have 
corroborated and fully explained Massey's defense. The jury never 
heard Sanslow's independent testimony. "Evidence from a neutral 
third party is not merely cumulative of a criminal defendant's 
testimony. It is of a different kind and nature than defendant's 
statements, and it certainly could have a different quality in 
the eyes of the jurors who assess the credibility of the 
witnesses." James, 819 P.2d at 794 (notes omitted). Massey has 
satisfied the second element set forth in James. 
B. A DIFFERENT RESULT IS PROBABLE IF MASSEY IS GRANTED A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The third prong concerns a prejudice analysis. The court 
must consider whether evidence that is now available is such "as 
to render a different result probable on retrial of the case." 
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James, 819 P.2d at 793. The state contends the third prong has 
not been met for several reasons: first, the prosecutor could 
have engaged in tactics on retrial to discredit Sanslow's 
detailed testimony of the transaction; second, Sanslow's 
testimony would have been cumulative where "other evidence 
bolster[ed]" the credibility of the two-sentence written 
statement; and third, the evidence marshalled in favor of the 
conviction, including "other evidence of defendant's guilt" and 
"defendant's inconsistent statements," supports the conviction. 
(S.B. 13-15.) Massey responds to each of the state's assertions 
in turn. 
1. The State's Contention That the Prosecutor Could Have 
Engaged in Tactics on Retrial to Discredit Sanslow's 
Testimony Is Speculative and Inappropriate. 
According to the state, Massey has failed to meet the third 
factor in James for the following reason: if Sanslow's complete 
testimony would have come into evidence on retrial, the state 
still would have been able to challenge Sanslow's credibility. 
(S.B. at 13.) That assertion refers to remarks the prosecutor 
would have made in closing argument on retrial, as opposed to the 
remarks concerning credibility that he made during the trial in 
this matter: During closing argument, the prosecutor exploited 
the brevity of the written statement by speculating that Massey 
and/or Sanslow were involved in selling guns. He stated, "[the 
statement d]oesn't even refer to [the gun] as a Derringer. You 
got to wonder whether [Sanslow's statement is] even talking about 
the same gun. I mean maybe they sold so many guns, they're 
starting to get confused over how many guns they sold and on 
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which days." (R. 408-09.) The state acknowledges that while 
Sanslow's "additional details" of the transaction resolve such 
conjecture (thereby "cur[ing]M the exploitation "problems" with 
the prosecutor's closing argument (S.B. at 13)), "[t]he 
additional details would not prevent the State from challenging 
Casey's credibility." (S.B. at 13.) 
The state's assertion is irrelevant. The issue of 
credibility is for the jury. In addition, the prejudice analysis 
does not require the parties to consider whether the prosecutor 
could have come up with some argument in closing or with cross-
examination during retrial to discredit Sanslow's new testimony, 
but whether the new evidence supports Massey's defense and 
provides additional, independent information for the jury's 
consideration. 
In addition, the state's assertion that Sanslow's complete 
testimony would not have prevented "the State from challenging 
[Sanslow's] credibility" is based on sheer speculation. The 
state assumes to know definitively what the prosecutor would have 
said concerning the credibility of Sanslow's testimony in closing 
argument on retrial, and whether such closing remarks would have 
been admissible and received by the trial court. Nothing in the 
record supports how the prosecutor would have summarized 
Sanslow's testimony in closing argument on retrial. Thus, the 
state should not be permitted to speculate on such matters. This 
Court should disregard the state's response as inappropriate, 
speculative and irrelevant. 
Most importantly, the state is forced to concede that the 
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new details would have prevented the prosecutor from speculating 
as he did with regard to the written statement. Among other 
things, the prosecutor would not have been able on retrial to 
place a question in jurors' minds as to whether Sanslow's written 
confession related to the same transaction at issue in Massey's 
case (R. 408-09 ("Notice how [Sanslow] identifies the gun. . . he 
calls it [] a little .22 handgun. . . You got to wonder whether 
he's even talking about the same gun")); and the prosecutor would 
not have been able on retrial to suggest to jurors that Sanslow 
and/or Massey "sold so many guns, they're starting to get 
confused over how many guns they sold and on which days" (id.). 
The state is forced to acknowledge the new evidence would clarify 
those issues for the prosecutor and the jury. 
2. The State Is Making Another Run at Its "Merely 
Cumulative" Argument in Claiming That "Other Evidence 
Bolster fed]" the Credibility of the Two-Sentence Statement. 
Next, the state asserts that a new trial would not compel a 
different result because of the "other evidence bolstering the 
[written] statement's credibility." (S.B. 13.) By that asser-
tion, the state suggests Sanslow's more detailed testimony would 
have added nothing to a new trial. That issue goes to the "merely 
cumulative" prong of the analysis. As set forth above and in the 
opening brief on appeal, Sanslow's affidavit statement is not 
"merely cumulative," but provides independent details concerning 
the transaction with the Kirby brothers. Those details should 
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have gone to the jury for consideration.1 
3. Rather Than Consider the "Prejudice" Prong, the State 
Has Improperly Marshalled the Evidence in Favor of the 
Verdict. 
Finally, in lieu of the prejudice analysis, the state has 
employed a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" analysis and has 
proceeded to "marshal" the evidence in favor of the jury's 
verdict. The state points to the "other evidence of defendant's 
guilt," the testimony of the Kirby brothers and the investigating 
officers, and "defendant's inconsistent statements" to assert the 
evidence supports the conviction. (S.B. 13-15.) The marshalled 
evidence is irrelevant. It adds nothing to the fact that the jury 
was never given the opportunity to assess Sanslow's independent 
testimony going to the details of the transaction, and his clear, 
detailed confession going to the offense. Sanslow's detailed 
statement goes to the heart of Massey's defense. 
In James, 819 P.2d at 795, the trial court denied the motion 
for a new trial because there was "sufficient" evidence to 
convict. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, stating that although 
the evidence may have been sufficient, the new testimony went to 
1
 Incidentally, the state has misrepresented the "evidence^ 
bolstering the statement's credibility. (S.B. at 13.) The state claims 
the "investigating officer stated that [Sanslow] consistently maintained 
his guilt and defendant's innocence, " thereby bolstering the statement's 
credibility. Yet the investigating officer clearly testified twice that 
notwithstanding Sanslow's written confession, he charged Massey with the 
crimes. He apparently believed the Kirbys' statements over the written 
confession. The officer never testified in a manner that "bolstered" the 
statements credibility. His testimony did just the opposite. 
In addition, "defense counsel['s]" statements "reinforc[ing] the 
confession's credibility" (S.B. at 13) do not rise to the level of 
"evidence," specifically where the jury was instructed that it "should 
not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial, 
unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence 
of a fact or facts." (R. 52.) 
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the heart of the defendant's case and corroborated defendant's 
statements. The new evidence placed the "sufficient" evidence in 
question: 
Our review of the evidence presented in the case shows that 
evidence of an intentional or knowing killing, while 
sufficient, is not overwhelming or compelling. Without the 
evidence of a plan to kill the child which can be derived 
from Peterson's testimony, the evidence of an intentional or 
knowing killing is scant and susceptible to differing 
interpretations. Peterson's testimony went to the heart of 
the evidence against defendant. Evidence that defendant was 
at the marina prior to his baby's disappearance and 
therefore had formulated a plan to kill the child was 
crucial to finding that defendant had the requisite intent 
to be convicted of murder. Without Peterson's testimony, 
which established this evidence, it is probable that a 
reasonable jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to 
whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit murder. 
Id. at 795. 
In this case, the state cites to the testimony of the Kirby 
brothers where they identify "defendant as the one who sold Grant 
the Derringer" and to "defendant's inconsistent statements." The 
testimony from the Kirby brothers puts Massey in the same 
position as the defendant in James, where witness Peterson 
testified that the defendant made a confession, while the 
defendant denied the same. 
Although Massey provided testimony that he was not involved 
in the transaction (R. 335-54; 361-62), Sanslow is the only 
witness who could discredit the Kirby brothers' testimony by 
providing clear details of the transaction. That is the more 
compelling basis for granting a new trial and submitting the 
credibility issues to the jury. 
With respect to "defendant's inconsistent statements," the 
state acknowledges that Massey consistently referred to Sanslow 
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throughout his testimony. The state also described confusion with 
regard to Massey's testimony regarding what "Casey [Sanslow] had 
told" Massey about the transaction. (S.B. at 14-15.) Clearly, 
Sanslow could have provided complete, independent testimony 
concerning his discussions with Massey. Again, Sanslow's 
testimony would not have been cumulative, but would have been 
enlightening with regard to the transaction and would have been 
the only testimony to corroborate Massey's defense. The state's 
entire response provides compelling bases for reversing the 
conviction and remanding the case for a new trial. Sanslow can 
provide detailed, independent testimony that would clear up the 
misconceptions and speculation the state presents in its 
response. Massey has met all factors set forth in James. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the original brief on 
appeal, and as supported by the record, Massey respectfully 
requests the entry of an order (1) reversing the trial court's 
denial of the motion for new trial, and (2) remanding the case to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with such a 
reversal. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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